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Summary 
Using a one-step stochastic frontier model for five developing countries (Brazil, 
Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, and Vietnam), we show that foreign firms benefit 
from a better investment climate, which significantly explains why they are more 
efficient than local firms. Unlike former studies, this paper uses the share of each firm’s 
sales to multinationals located in the country to assess the importance of vertical 
spillovers, and it controls for the direct impact of the investment climate on efficiency. 
The results show that firms (particularly small local firms) that sell more of their 
production to multinationals are more efficient. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: D24, F23, O50, O14.  
Keywords: Foreign ownership, Firm-level efficiency, Vertical spillovers, Investment climate, 
Developing Countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The author would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Andrew Berg, Jean-Louis 
Combes, Anne Grant, Alain de Janvry, Jaime de Melo, Gérard Duchêne, Rachid Laajaj, Patrick 
Plane, Caitlin Sanford, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Abdoul Mijiyawa. 
  2
1. INTRODUCTION 
Differences in productivity among countries and regions partly explain differences in 
countries’ income levels (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Easterly and Levine, 2001). These differences arise in part because of technological 
disparities (Howitt, 2000; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). In developing countries, 
investment climate factors such as infrastructure, finance, human capital, institutions, 
and regulatory policies are also important sources of differences in productivity.  
A business-friendly environment is important for productivity. Skilled human capital 
improves firm productivity by allowing companies to make better use of current 
technologies and to acquire new ones (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002). Financial development is also an important aspect of the 
business environment. It increases firm productivity by stimulating profitable 
investments through better selection and allocation of resources to the most profitable 
projects (Levine, 1997). Transport and telecommunication failures or unreliable 
electricity supply increase the cost for suppliers to connect with their clients and the 
cost of doing business generally (World Bank, 1994). Bribes to public officials to obtain 
advantages in the application of government laws and regulations increase economic 
distortions that reduce firm productivity. Inefficiency in delivering public services and 
the time managers spend dealing with government regulations (customs, licenses, and 
registrations) also affect firms by increasing their allocative inefficiency (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, 
and Mengistae, 2005, 2006). 
Beyond the potential of foreign investments to finance saving gaps, policy makers often 
seek to attract foreign firms to benefit from higher productivity and positive spillovers 
to local firms. Local firms indeed benefit from the presence of foreign companies 
through transfers of new technologies, management methods, products, and 
production processes. Positive spillovers will occur, however, only if foreign firms are 
more productive or have more technological knowledge than local companies. 
Domestic firms could thus learn from foreign companies by observation, by doing 
business with them, or through labor turnover. Foreign companies either directly or as 
shareholders in domestic firms are potentially correlated with more efficient productive 
practices. They benefit from new technologies, management practices, and 
opportunities for financing from their parent companies. For instance, by using foreign 
expertise and finance—rarely available to domestic firms—foreign companies may 
more easily update their production processes when facing local constraints like an 
unreliable supply of electricity.  
However, foreign firms could also be less efficient than local companies because they 
may not understand the specifics of local markets. For instance, where there are high 
administrative burdens and the economy is not sufficiently market-oriented, foreign 
ownership may have little effect on firm productivity. Empirical results are mixed about 
the impact of foreign ownership on firm productivity. Khawar (2003) finds that foreign 
firms are more productive than local enterprises in Mexico, but in a study of Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Poland, Angelucci et al. (2001) find that foreign firms are more 
productive than local firms only in Poland. 
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This paper uses manufacturing firm data from World Bank surveys in five developing 
countries (Brazil, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, and Vietnam) in the mid-2000s. It 
tests for the first time whether a better investment climate for foreign firms can explain 
their higher productivity than local companies. The paper also introduces an innovative 
way of measuring vertical spillovers at firm level by using the share of each firm’s sales 
to multinationals located in the country.  
The next section reviews recent evidence on productivity spillovers from foreign firms 
to local companies. Section 3 describes the one-step stochastic frontier model. Section 
4 presents the enterprise survey data, and Section 5 analyzes the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. FOREIGN FIRMS AND PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS 
The literature distinguishes horizontal from vertical spillover. Horizontal spillover 
refers to the increase in the aggregate productivity of a sector because of the entry of 
foreign firms whose productivity is higher. This entry acts as an incentive for other 
firms to increase their productivity because the environment is more competitive. 
Higher productivity due to horizontal spillover also results from copying new 
technologies and production processes or by hiring trained workers and managers from 
foreign firms. Local firms with the lowest productivity that cannot catch up with higher 
performers in the sector could be crowded out of the market.  
Vertical spillover refers to increasing productivity by doing business with foreign 
companies. Such spillovers affect domestic firms that supply goods and services to 
foreign firms or are clients of the foreign firms. Foreign firms may require higher 
standards—product quality or delivery time—from their local suppliers, pushing up 
their productivity. Productivity could also rise when foreign firms provide their 
domestic clients with good-quality products. Multinational firms have incentives to 
transfer knowledge to firms upstream. These knowledge transfers could improve the 
performance of their local suppliers. 
Empirical analyses of spillovers from foreign firms use an input-output matrix to derive 
sector-based indicators of spillovers. For horizontal spillovers, the indicator is the share 
of sector output produced by affiliates of foreign companies. Vertical spillovers can be 
grouped in backward and forward linkages. Backward linkages measure the spillovers 
from the presence of foreign firms downstream. They are captured by the weighted 
share of foreign capital from all the sectors that are supplied by the sector under 
consideration. Forward linkages measure the spillovers from the presence of foreign 
firms upstream. They are captured by the weighted share of foreign capital of all sectors 
supplying the subject sector. The weights in backward and forward linkages are the 
share of subject sector output used as intermediate inputs by another sector.  
Empirical studies have produced rather mixed results. Early analyses of spillovers that 
focus on intra-industry (horizontal) spillovers find a positive correlation between 
foreign presence and firm performance. However, evidence of horizontal spillovers 
from firm-level studies is much less clear. For developing countries2, Khawar (2003) 
finds no evidence of positive spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in Mexico. 
Using panel data for manufacturing industries in China, Liu (2002) finds a positive 
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effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on domestic firms. But Haddad and Harrison 
(1993) find negative spillovers associated with FDI in Morocco and Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) reach a similar conclusion for Venezuela. According to the latter, the 
negative spillovers are caused by competition from foreign firms that force local firms 
to produce less at higher cost, which offsets the positive impact of technology transfers 
from FDI. Although evidence on spillovers, particularly horizontal, is mixed, recent 
firm-level studies show that local firms supplying sectors in which foreign firms operate 
(vertical spillovers) are more productive. Lui (2008) finds positive vertical spillovers 
with backward and forward linkages between industries in China. Javorcik (2004) casts 
doubt on positive horizontal spillovers from foreign firms in Lithuania but underlines 
the existence of vertical spillovers from upstream. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) 
illustrate the importance of local participation to vertical and horizontal spillovers in 
Romania. Blalock and Gertler (2004) confirm the importance of vertical spillovers in 
Indonesia.  
The recent studies use firm-level data for estimating productivity. However, variables 
capturing spillovers are still defined by sector. Sector information could hide significant 
heterogeneity between firms within the sector. Indeed, interactions between foreign 
firms and local companies might be limited to the biggest, which are on average the 
most productive, local firms in the sector. Instead of using sector information to assess 
the importance of business between foreign and local firms, this paper uses for the first 
time information on the share of a firm’s sales to multinational companies within the 
country to capture backward linkages. 
3. A ONE-STEP STOCHASTIC FRONTIER MODEL 
The one-step stochastic frontier model simultaneously estimates the production 
function, the determinants of firm inefficiency, and a composite error term with two 
uncorrelated elements. The first element (v) is a random variable capturing external 
shocks affecting firms. These shocks are independently and identically distributed, and 
follow a normal distribution with zero mean and σ² standard deviation. The second 
element (u), which represents technical inefficiency, has a truncated normal 
distribution.3 The mean of the truncated inefficiency depends on exogenous variables, 
such as those related to the investment climate. The one-step stochastic frontier model 
does not suffer from the omitted variables bias the way the two-step procedure does.4 
Indeed, production frontier inputs are probably influenced by factors similar to those 
affecting technical efficiency (Marschak and Andrews, 1944; Griliches and Mairesse, 
1995). Estimating the stochastic production frontier with the two-step approach is thus 
biased because explanatory variables are omitted in the first step. 
The one-step stochastic frontier model can be written as follows: 
ln ln ( , , , , , )csit csit csit c s t csit csitY f L K D D D V Uβ= + −      (1) 
Ycsit is the output of the firm i in country c and sector s during year t. Lcsit and Kcsit 
represent labor and capital. Dc, Ds, and Dt respectively reflect dummies for country, 
sector, and years.5 β is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The technical 
inefficiency term, Ucsit, , be can defined as: 
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'
csit csi csitU Z δ η= +               (2) 
Zcsit includes investment climate variables; firm-specific characteristics such as foreign 
ownership, size, and age; and the variable capturing spillovers from foreign to local 
firms. δ is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated. η csit is a random variable 
defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and 2σ variance. 
Incorporating equation 2 into equation 1 leads to the following one-step production 
frontier model: 
'ln ln ( , , , , , ) ( )csit csit csit c s t csit csi csitY f L K D D D V Zβ δ η= + − +            (3) 
The parameters of the stochastic frontier and the model explaining technical 
inefficiency are simultaneously estimated with the maximum likelihood method. The 
technical efficiency function derived from the stochastic frontier model is as follows: 
exp( ) exp( )csit csit csi csitTE U z δ η= − = − −                     (4) 
A predictor of the technical efficiency for the i-th firm in country c and sector s at the t-
th observation is defined by equation 5: 
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and (.)Φ represents the distribution function of the standard Gaussian random variable. 
4. DATA 
World Bank enterprise surveys collect data on input, output, investment climate, and 
various firm characteristics (ownership, age, etc.). The surveys cover such areas as 
public regulation, governance, and access to finance or infrastructure.  
In this paper, investment climate is captured by four indicators: infrastructure, 
institutions, human capital, and finance. The indicators were selected based on their 
availability, objectivity, and capacity to capture key dimensions of the investment 
climate. Infrastructure is captured by electricity problems that lead firms to use 
generators to produce their own electricity. This infrastructure variable thus captures 
both the electricity problem and firm responses to it. Indeed, where electricity is 
insufficient and unreliable, more capitalistic and productive firms may rely more on 
their own generators. Human capital is captured by the percentage of the workforce 
with secondary education. Financing problems are represented by limits to access to 
  6
formal finance, such as an overdraft facility; the share of informal sources of finance 
(friends, family, etc.) in firm working capital captures this. Institutions are captured by 
labor regulation, property rights protection, and the share of senior managers’ time 
spent in dealing with government regulation.  
The analysis covers five sectors: textiles, wearing apparel, and leather; food, beverages, 
and tobacco; wood and wood products, including furniture; chemicals and plastic 
products; and manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment. It 
covers 4,510 firms from five developing countries for 2000–2005: Brazil (2003), 
Morocco (2004), Pakistan (2002), South Africa (2003), and Vietnam (2005).6  
Enterprise surveys contain production function data for the surveyed year and two 
years before. However, investment climate indicators refer only to the current year. 
Kernel distribution graphs show some stability in productivity distribution across three 
consecutive years (Appendix 3). Combining firms, sectors, and countries allows us to 
control (through country and sector dummies) for time-invariant factors that are 
common to all firms in a specific sector and country.  
While firm production function could vary slightly over three years, investment climate 
is a more structural factor that is constant over such a short period (Dollar et al., 2005). 
Consequently, there are three alternative ways to estimate and explain firms’ 
productivity:  
• Consider production function and investment climate variables for the year 
surveyed. 
• Estimate the production function for the three years and explain productivity 
averages for the period by investment climate variables. This method is not relevant 
here because it refers to a two-step procedure.  
• Consider investment climate variables as constant for the three consecutive years 
and allow some variability in the production function (Dollar et al., 2005). This is 
the method used here. 
Investment climate variables can be captured by both objective information and firm 
perceptions7 of investment climate constraints. Subjective variables could be more 
affected by measurement errors. Indeed, more productive firms may have less concern 
about investment climate constraints than less productive firms. As a consequence, the 
same investment climate could be assessed differently depending on firm performance. 
That is why this analysis retains only objective variables that are not subject to 
subjective judgments. Although using objective variables reduces the endogeneity 
arising from measurement errors, simultaneity bias could remain. Regional-sector 
averages of investment climate indicators are used to reduce this bias (Dollar et al., 
2005; Commander and Svejnar, 2008).  
5. RESULTS 
Before the stochastic frontier method is applied, nonparametric total factor 
productivity (TFP) is estimated. Table 1 presents firm-level TFP by sector, on the 
assumption that sector-based technology leads to more homogenous production 
functions.  
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Table 1: Mean and median of firm total factor productivity 
 Period t Period t-1 Period t-2 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Food and Beverage       
Brazil 0,90 0,93 0,85 0,96 0,83 0,91 
Morocco 0,64 0,68 0,30 0,42 0,43 0,57 
Pakistan 0,59 0,44 0,46 0,42 0,44 0,38 
South Africa 1,10 1,23 1,06 1,11 0,83 1,03 
Vietnam 0,22 0,26 0,15 0,22 0,29 0,34 
Textile and  W. Apparel       
Brazil 1,02 0,98 1,08 1,07 1,09 1,08 
Morocco 0,77 0,72 0,75 0,72 0,71 0,68 
Pakistan 0,81 0,65 0,63 0,52 0,50 0,36 
South Africa 1,18 1,06 1,17 1,00 1,12 1,08 
Vietnam 0,23 0,29 0,22 0,25 0,10 0,19 
Wood  incl. furniture       
Brazil 0,92 0,89 0,98 0,96 1,00 1,01 
Morocco 0,22 0,26 1,20 0,67 -0,02 -0,33 
South Africa 1,13 1,02 1,06 1,06 1,06 0,91 
Vietnam 0,47 0,44 0,39 0,38 0,38 0,32 
Chemicals and plastic products       
Brazil 1,10 1,11 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,78 
Morocco 0,80 0,60 0,74 0,63 0,71 0,52 
Pakistan 0,67 0,55 0,52 0,50 0,34 0,34 
South Africa 1,10 1,04 1,26 1,19 1,24 1,16 
Vietnam 0,25 0,28 0,20 0,27 0,22 0,23 
Machinery and Equipment       
Brazil 0,94 0,91 0,97 0,91 0,93 0,86 
Morocco 0,90 0,64 0,81 0,70 0,97 0,86 
Pakistan 0,76 0,77 0,64 0,61 0,60 0,52 
South Africa 1,03 0,95 1,02 0,88 0,97 0,88 
Vietnam 0,31 0,39 0,43 0,44 0,35 0,44 
 
In all industries and periods South Africa has the most firms performing well, followed 
closely by Brazil. Vietnam ranks at the bottom, except in the wood and furniture sector, 
and Morocco and Pakistan are in the middle. Differences in productivity track 
differences in country income. Except for Morocco in the wood and furniture sector, 
TFP is relatively constant across the three years observed. 
a) Foreign ownership and firm efficiency 
The Cobb-Douglas functional form describes the production technology. Alternative 
functional forms such as translog did not reveal significant differences.8 While country 
and sector dummies are significant, year dummies are not, which supports equality of 
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productivity distribution across three consecutive years. The standard error of the 
inefficiency component ( uσ ) is significant, confirming the relevance of the stochastic 
frontier hypothesis against the OLS model, which considers error terms as normally 
distributed. 
This section analyzes investment climate as a potential transmission channel through 
which foreign ownership could affect firm productivity. The hypothesis is that foreign 
firms could benefit more from a better investment climate than local firms, leading to 
higher productivity. When investment climate variables are introduced in the 
regressions, the foreign firm coefficient is significantly reduced, indicating that a better 
investment climate for foreign firms is one transmission channel of the positive effect 
of foreign ownership on firm productivity (Table 2). 
This paper thus proposes an alternative way to analyze why foreign firms9 are more 
productive than local firms. Beyond the usual argument of access to better technologies 
and management practices, we suggest that foreign firms could be more productive 
because they benefit from a better investment climate when doing business than local 
firms do. The investment climate, which might be assumed to be similar for all firms 
operating in the same area, could in fact be different for foreign firms—or at least 
affect them differently. In fact, foreign firms may resist degradation of the investment 
climate more, or may influence it positively. Foreign firms could also locate in areas 
where the investment climate is more favorable (Kinda, 2008, 2010). 
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Table 2: Foreign ownership, investment climate, and firm inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Production Function     
Ln(Capital) 0.184 0.178 0.175 0.175 
 (31.30)*** (30.25)*** (29.55)*** (29.50)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.744 0.736 0.733 0.734 
 (73.02)*** (69.05)*** (68.91)*** (66.17)*** 
Constant 1.751 2.210 2.232 2.242 
 (13.88)*** (12.28)*** (13.75)*** (8.53)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm inefficiency) 
Size -0.158 -0.134 -0.138 -0.134 
 (8.64)*** (7.48)*** (8.06)*** (6.84)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.45) (0.98) (1.39) (1.50) 
Foreign Firm -0.287  -0.153 -0.149 
 (4.90)***  (3.68)*** (3.55)*** 
Export (% of sales)    0.000 
    (0.92) 
Informal Finance  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (3.17)*** (3.12)*** (3.19)*** 
Electricity Problems  0.222 0.211 0.220 
  (4.20)*** (3.88)*** (4.18)*** 
Workforce Education  -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
  (7.99)*** (8.26)*** (7.02)*** 
Property Rights Protection  -0.034 -0.029 -0.029 
  (2.17)** (1.86)* (1.88)* 
Regulation Management  0.006 0.007 0.006 
  (2.63)*** (2.88)*** (2.94)*** 
Constant 1.169 1.117 1.142 1.191 
 (9.39)*** (6.31)*** (6.42)*** (5.29)*** 
Observations 8272 8051 8036 8008 
sigma_u 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] 
sigma_v 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.66 
 [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] 
Wald chi2 19323.41 17106.39 16522.23 15873.94 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. Numbers in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sector dummies. 
All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except informal finance 
variable, which is firm-level information.  
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To reduce the potential endogeneity bias of investment climate variables, we use as 
investment climate variables city-sector averages by size and foreign ownership status.10 
Regional averages and firm-level information are used as variables for financing 
constraints. The results are robust to both definitions, and the rest of the analysis 
retains firm-level information.  
Other results show that bigger firms are more productive. Except for labor regulation, 
all investment climate variables are significant. Firms with better access to credit, 
electricity, and skilled workers are more efficient. These firms are, for instance, better 
able to handle technologies, old and new, because they have more skilled workers. They 
also benefit from better access to raw materials and intermediate consumption through 
their access to credit. By reducing transaction costs, secure property rights and lower 
regulatory constraints create a business-friendly environment, which stimulates firm 
performance.  
Figure 1 confirms that foreign firms have a better investment climate. Financing 
constraints and an unskilled workforce are particularly problems for domestic firms. 
Foreign firms rely more on their own generators to produce electricity when unreliable 
electricity forces firms to adopt the more costly alternative. Given their higher financing 
constraints, which limits their ability to buy generators, domestic firms thus suffer more 
from electricity problems than foreign firms. Most institutional problems affect local 
and foreign firms about equally, but property rights are more secure for foreign firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Major investment climate variables and capital ownership 
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However, for institutional factors the argument could go either way: Since foreign firms 
do not know the local context as well as local firms, they might have more difficulties in 
dealing with official regulations. On the other hand, policy makers, particularly in 
developing countries, often seek to attract FDI with such incentives as tax breaks, 
lower administrative burdens, and better protection of property rights. These incentives 
could lower the administrative cost of doing business and offer a better institutional 
framework to foreign firms than local ones.  
We use multivariate analysis to test whether these insights are correct. The following 
section uses cross-terms between investment climate and foreign ownership variables to 
assess whether foreign ownership is effective in helping firms to dampen the negative 
effect of investment climate constraints on their productivity (see Table 3).  
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Table 3: Foreign ownership, investment climate, and firm inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Production Function    
Ln(Capital) 0.175 0.174 0.174 
 (29.54)*** (29.51)*** (29.48)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.732 0.732 0.732 
 (68.96)*** (67.59)*** (67.89)*** 
Constant 2.206 2.337 2.323 
 (14.18)*** (10.70)*** (10.86)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm inefficiency) 
Size -0.136 -0.128 -0.129 
 (7.93)*** (7.18)*** (7.15)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.33) (1.55) (1.47) 
Foreign Firm 0.150 0.173 0.050 
 (0.54) (0.92) (0.20) 
Informal Finance 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (3.00)*** (3.17)*** (3.08)*** 
Electricity Problems 0.252 0.273 0.262 
 (4.21)*** (4.76)*** (4.52)*** 
Workforce Education -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 (8.16)*** (8.28)*** (8.14)*** 
Property Rights Protection -0.030  -0.028 
 (1.72)*  (1.67)* 
Regulation Management  0.001 0.001 
  (0.23) (0.29) 
Informal Finance*Foreign Firm 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.15) (0.42) (0.40) 
Electricity Problems*Foreign Firm -0.223 -0.257 -0.248 
 (1.86)* (2.43)** (2.30)** 
Workforce Education*Foreign Firm -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.26) (0.03) (0.04) 
Property Rights Protection*Foreign Firm 0.019  0.026 
 (0.46)  (0.66) 
Regulation Management*Foreign Firm  0.013 0.013 
  (3.08)*** (3.03)*** 
Constant 1.086 1.008 1.132 
 (5.98)*** (5.14)*** (5.57)*** 
Observations 8036 8036 8036 
sigma_u 0.26 0.25 0.26 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] 
sigma_v 0.66 0.66 0.66 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] 
Wald chi2 16825.69 15922.96 15978.95 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Numbers in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year, country, and sector 
dummies. All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except 
informal finance variable, which is firm-level information. 
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The results confirm that investment climate constraints undermine firm productivity. 
However, except for regulation management, investment climate constraints are not 
significant hurdles for foreign firms. Foreign firms positively influence their own 
investment climate—for instance, they use their own generators to become more 
efficient than the average firm. Given their limited knowledge of local markets 
compared to domestic firms, and their better use of production time, however, foreign 
firms suffer more from time lost in dealing with government regulation.  
Local firms have a more difficult time accessing financing, and when they do it is more 
expensive. They also have less power than foreign firms when lobbying policy makers 
to get secure property rights. Local firms also attract less-qualified workers, since 
qualified workers prefer the higher salaries offered by foreign firms. The capacity of 
local firms to compensate for deficient infrastructure is also more limited. These 
findings are very relevant, given the potential of local firms for job creation. 
Beyond their direct effect on aggregate productivity, foreign firms could also improve 
country-level productivity by increasing the efficiency of local firms through spillovers 
from foreign to local firms.  
b) Sales to multinationals and firm efficiency 
In contrast to former studies using sector-level information to capture spillovers, this 
paper for the first time uses data on the share of each firm’s sales that goes to 
multinational companies located in the country to capture spillovers, specifically vertical 
spillovers. 
First, the empirical analysis is done for all firms before restricting the sample to local 
firms and even small local firms as a robustness check. Information on the share of 
firms’ sales to multinationals in the country has the advantage of capturing the exact 
extent of cooperation between foreign and local firms. This makes it possible to control 
for the potential heterogeneity of spillovers within sectors. In addition, unlike other 
studies this paper controls for investment climate variables, capturing the effect of the 
business environment on spillovers. Table 4 shows the results. 
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Table 4: Sales to multinationals and firm inefficiency 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Production Function      
Ln(capital) 0.199 0.178 0.178 0.177 0.173 
 (34.22)*** (29.00)*** (28.95)*** (28.85)*** (28.24)*** 
Ln(labor) 0.797 0.743 0.743 0.742 0.739 
 (98.43)*** (67.01)*** (67.03)*** (66.75)*** (66.39)*** 
Constant 1.892 2.596 2.626 1.962 2.710 
 (12.00)*** (12.88)*** (12.75)*** (14.05)*** (12.59)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm inefficiency) 
Size -2.535 -0.146 -0.145 -0.149 -0.146 
 (5.57)*** (7.77)*** (7.74)*** (7.84)*** (8.22)*** 
Age -0.045 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.44) (0.98) (0.98) (1.07) (1.43) 
Sales to multinational -0.078 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (2.46)** (3.50)*** (3.51)*** (3.50)*** (3.12)*** 
Informal finance  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (3.35)*** (3.40)*** (3.36)*** (3.40)*** 
Electricity problem  0.218 0.218 0.216 0.212 
  (3.55)*** (3.63)*** (3.48)*** (3.54)*** 
Workforce education  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
  (7.16)*** (7.15)*** (6.94)*** (7.34)*** 
Property rights protection  -0.029 -0.029 -0.030 -0.020 
  (1.66)* (1.64) (1.68)* (1.17) 
Regulation Management   0.004 0.004 0.004 
   (1.50) (1.55) (1.82)* 
Export (% of sales)    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.71) (0.18) 
Foreign Firm     -0.176 
     (3.76)*** 
Constant -4.071 1.199 1.190 1.186 1.218 
 (2.68)*** (6.49)*** (6.44)*** (6.34)*** (6.32)*** 
Observations 7622 7403 7403 7387 7375 
sigma_u 2.27 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 
 [0.71] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] 
sigma_v 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 
 [0.10] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.16] 
Wald chi2 36050.72 14382.33 14121.22 13720.07 13507.58 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Numbers in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
Sale to multinational is the percentage of firms’ sales to domestic multinational in the country. All investment climate 
variables are industry-region averages by capital ownership except informal finance variable, which is firm-level 
information.  
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As it did in the previous section, investment climate significantly explains firm 
productivity. Firms selling more of their production to multinationals are more 
productive. The higher productivity of suppliers to foreign firms could be the 
consequence of the foreign firms demanding higher standards, tighter timing, and 
better quality. The positive relationship between firm efficiency and the percentage of 
their sales that goes to multinationals could thus be interpreted as implying that 
productivity is improved when firms do business with foreign companies.  
Low-performing local firms that cannot meet the requirements of foreign firms could 
be crowded out of the market. Crowding-out would be problematic if market selection 
of firms supplying multinational companies leads to the exclusion of local or small 
firms. If that happens, only big and foreign firms would drive aggregate productivity 
improvement. Given the potential and the importance of local firms to create jobs in 
developing countries, crowding them out will affect local employment negatively. 
Baseline regressions include firm size and a foreign ownership variable to control for 
these two aspects. Regardless of firm size and foreign participation in their capital 
structure, firms selling more of their production to multinationals are more productive. 
Additional robustness checks based exclusively on samples of local and small-local 
firms confirm the results (Appendix 5). 
Local firms and small-local firms that do business with multinationals located in the 
country are more productive. Even with the restricted sample of local and small-local 
firms, a selectivity problem could arise. Indeed, higher competition induced by demand 
from multinational companies could lead to the exit from the market of nonproductive 
local firms and the entry of new, more productive, local firms. This possibility 
highlights the potential simultaneity bias in our results. Causality direction does not 
matter here. Whether local firms are more productive because of technology-sharing 
with foreign firms or because inefficient local firms drop out and more productive ones 
enter, the impact of doing business with foreign firms is positive for local firms in the 
aggregate and for the economy at large. Finally, foreign firms could also be choosing 
the most productive local firms as domestic suppliers. The literature on exporter firms 
has showed that only the most productive firms become exporters (Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998). Local firms face higher constraints 
than foreign firms to access finance, reliable electricity, or skilled workers (section 5.a). 
Given these constraints, the potential for local firms to improve their productivity by 
doing business with multinationals firms (through labor turnover, employee training, or 
better access to local finance) is significant. The results also show that small-local firms, 
which are on average less productive, exhibit higher productivity when doing business 
with local multinationals. However, the study does not rule out the fact multinationals 
firms could select the most productive local firms but do suggest that those local firms 
(particularly small-local firms) doing business with multinationals still improve their 
productivity. The available data do not allow us to test these alternative possibilities. As 
multinationals firms prefer to develop long-term relationships with their local suppliers, 
testing the dynamic of a sizeable number of local firms that become multinationals 
suppliers during a specific time requires long-term firm-level data on local firms’ 
interactions with multinationals. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
By analyzing the efficiency of manufacturing firms through a one-step stochastic 
frontier approach, this paper has proposed that differences in the investment climate of 
foreign and local firms are the main factors contributing to foreign firms higher 
productivity. A new way to test vertical spillovers from foreign to local firms is also 
explored. 
The results show that foreign firms’ better investment climate explains their higher 
productivity compared to local firms. Foreign firms can positively influence the 
investment climate—or locate where the investment climate is better. Based on firm-
level information, the paper finds evidence of vertical spillovers from foreign to local 
firms. Unlike previous studies that estimate spillovers at the sector level, this paper for 
the first time uses the share of each firm’s sales to multinationals located within the 
country to assess spillovers. The results show that local firms and particularly small-
local firms selling part of their production to multinationals are more productive. This 
confirms vertical spillovers through backward linkages in our sample countries. 
In defining strategies to improve competitiveness, particular attention should be given 
to the business environment, particularly for local firms, which face more hurdles than 
foreign firms. Better cooperation between local and foreign firms could also magnify 
spillovers.  
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NOTES 
1. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) have predicted in their theoretical model that 
only the most productive firms become multinational.  
2. In developed countries, the positive impact of foreign ownership on firm 
performances has been highlighted by a number of authors, e.g., Piscitello and Rabbiosi 
(2005) and Temouri, Driffield, and Higón (2008).  
3. The distribution of firm inefficiency is not sensitive to alternative statistical 
distributions such as exponential and half-normal (Coelli, Prasada Rao, and Battese, 
1998). 
4. The two-step stochastic frontier first estimates the stochastic production frontier and 
then explains the residuals of the first estimation (the technical efficiency) by a vector 
of explanatory variables. 
5. Dummies pick up the effect of country -or sector- specific factors, such as natural 
resources endowment, national institutions, macroeconomic or political instability, and 
trade policy.  
6. The number of firms by country is as follow: Brazil: 1,474; Morocco: 789; Pakistan: 
822; South Africa: 432; and Vietnam: 993. Countries were chosen according to data 
availability. 
7. Firms are asked to quantify their constraints on a scale going from none to very 
severe. 
8. More flexible functional forms such as translog did not reveal any significant 
variation of technology coefficients and investment climate coefficients. With translog, 
labor elasticities are 0.75 and capital elasticities 0.18. Elasticities of labor squared are 
0.06, of capital squared 0.05, and the cross term between labor and capital is -0.05. The 
Spearman correlation rank between Cobb-Douglas and translog efficiency is 0.98 and 
statistically significant at 1 percent. 
9. Following the standard IMF definition of foreign direct investment, foreign 
ownership variable is a dummy taking one if at least 10% of firm capital is foreign and 
zero otherwise. 
10. We ensure getting a sufficient number of firms by city, sector, size, and foreign 
ownership status. The results are robust to alternative way of aggregation. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of variables 
Variable Definition 
                                                 Production Function 
Ln(value added) Logarithm of value added 
Ln(capital) Logarithm of capital  
Ln(labor) Logarithm of labor 
  
                                                 Firm Specific Characteristics 
Sales to multinationals Percentage of firm’s sales to domestic multinational firms in the country 
Size Number of permanent workers in the firm 
Age Firm age 
Export (% of sales) Firm export as a percent of sales 
Foreign firm Dummy equal one if at least 10% of firm capital is foreign 
  
                                                  Investment Climate 
Informal finance Percentage of firms working capital coming from informal source (friends, 
family, money lenders) 
Electricity problem Percentage of firms that own or share a generator 
Workforce education Percentage of workorce with secondary education 
Property rights protection Indicator of protection of property rights by the judicial system scaled from one 
to six with higher scale indicating better protection 
Regulation Management Percentage of senior managers’ time dealing with government regulation 
Labor regulation Percentage of the optimal level of employment compared to the current level 
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Firm Specific Characteristics 
Sales to multinationals 8.1 21.1 0 100 
Size 205.2 693.6 1 20503 
Age 20.1 17.9 1 125 
Export (% of sales) 10.4 23. 7 0 100 
Foreign firm 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Investment Climate 
Informal finance 3.9 13.7 0 100 
Electricity problem 0.2 0.2 0 1 
Workforce education 9.7 11.0 0 100 
Property rights protection 3.9 0.6 1 6 
Labor regulation 117.6 30.7 50 668.9 
Regulation Management 7.8 5.6 0 100 
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Appendix 3: Distribution of productivity across three consecutive years 
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Appendix 4: Investment climate, foreign ownership and, firm inefficiency 
(No control for firms’ specific characteristics)  
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Production Function     
Ln(Capital) 0.217 0.213 0.212 0.213 
 (44.18)*** (43.48)*** (43.32)*** (43.57)*** 
Ln(Labor) 0.777 0.775 0.775 0.767 
 (126.36)*** (123.88)*** (123.62)*** (120.21)*** 
Constant 1.243 1.220 1.232 1.285 
 (23.08)*** (22.17)*** (21.67)*** (23.01)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm inefficiency) 
Foreign Firm -6.626  -4.292 -2.967 
 (4.22)***  (3.01)*** (2.18)** 
Export (% of sales)    -0.063 
    (4.83)*** 
Informal Finance  0.041 0.041 0.040 
  (5.41)*** (4.82)*** (5.03)*** 
Electricity Problem  1.388 1.426 1.581 
  (1.72)* (1.67)* (1.77)* 
Workforce Education  -0.225 -0.214 -0.227 
  (5.92)*** (4.93)*** (5.65)*** 
Property Rights Protection  -2.561 -2.658 -2.572 
  (8.89)*** (6.82)*** (8.21)*** 
Regulation Management  0.042 0.043 0.043 
  (2.14)** (2.07)** (2.07)** 
Constant -11.439 -3.098 -3.162 -3.582 
 (10.78)*** (2.06)** (1.94)* (2.16)** 
Observations 12898 12650 12635 12527 
sigma_u 2.10 2.03 2.08 2.15 
 [0.55] [0.58] [0.75] [0.63] 
sigma_v 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 
 [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 
Wald chi2 66646.59 60685.64 59534.60 58411.08 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Numbers in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
All investment climate variables are industry-region averages by size and capital ownership except informal finance 
variable which, is firm-level information.  
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Appendix 5: Sales to multinationals and firm inefficiency 
(Robustness for small and local firms) 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Value added) 
 All firms Local Firms Small-Local Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Production Function      
Ln(capital) 0.178 0.177 0.173 0.192 0.168 
 (28.95)*** (28.85)*** (28.24)*** (31.03)*** (22.64)*** 
Ln(labor) 0.743 0.742 0.739 0.792 0.726 
 (67.03)*** (66.75)*** (66.39)*** (90.92)*** (57.82)*** 
Constant 2.626 1.962 2.710 1.813 1.565 
 (12.75)*** (14.05)*** (12.59)*** (11.20)*** (23.18)*** 
Investment Climate (Investment climate variables are regressed on firm inefficiency) 
Size -0.145 -0.149 -0.146 -1.746 -0.197 
 (7.74)*** (7.84)*** (8.22)*** (5.16)*** (6.57)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.000 
 (0.98) (1.07) (1.43) (0.53) (0.14) 
Sales to multinational -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.041 -0.005 
 (3.51)*** (3.50)*** (3.12)*** (1.90)* (2.61)*** 
Informal finance 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.001 
 (3.40)*** (3.36)*** (3.40)*** (1.64) (1.03) 
Electricity problem 0.218 0.216 0.212 0.690 0.060 
 (3.63)*** (3.48)*** (3.54)*** (0.41) (0.50) 
Workforce education -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.183 -0.017 
 (7.15)*** (6.94)*** (7.34)*** (4.47)*** (6.29)*** 
Property rights protection -0.029 -0.030 -0.020 -0.638 -0.087 
 (1.64) (1.68)* (1.17) (1.61) (2.92)*** 
Regulation Management 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.016 -0.001 
 (1.50) (1.55) (1.82)* (0.20) (0.23) 
Export (% of sales)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.047 -0.109 
  (0.71) (0.18) (1.47) (4.20)*** 
Foreign firm   -0.176   
   (3.76)***   
Constant 1.190 1.186 1.218 -0.366 1.422 
 (6.44)*** (6.34)*** (6.32)*** (0.09) (4.72)*** 
Observations 7403 7387 7375 6786 5022 
sigma_u 0.35 0.35 0.34 1.93 0.30 
 [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.56] [0.14] 
sigma_v 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.65 
 [0.16] [0.15] [0.16] [0.10] [0.13] 
Wald chi2 14121.22 13720.07 13507.58 29619.19 9186.57 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Numbers in brackets for sigma_u and sigma_v are standard errors. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include year, country, and sectoral dummies. 
Sale to multinational is the percentage of firm sales to domestic multinational. All investment climate variables are industry-
region averages by capital ownership except informal finance variable, which is firm-level information.  
  
 
